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Abstract 
The scientific environment might influence university researchers’ job designs. In a principal–agent 
model, researchers must choose between substitutable tasks, publishing or teaching, according to 
their individual abilities and the scientific and pedagogical context that exists in their universities. 
This proposed model shows that scientific production can increase, regardless of researchers’ 
abilities, if the scientific environment favours agglomeration effects. The authors test these 
predictions using an original data set of French economics professors that reveals their individual 
investments in both teaching and publishing. The econometric results confirm that the tasks conflict 
and that the scientific context affects researchers’ investments in each task. 
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1. Introduction 
As the pioneering works by Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) showed, academic research is 
essential to the production of knowledge. Knowledge production in turn expands innovation 
and economic growth (Romer, 1990). Therefore, academic research represents an economic 
strategy, and many studies seek to understand what determines scientific production. These 
studies are now a recognized field of research in economics, called the economics of science 
(Dasgupta and David, 1994; Stephan, 1996; Stephan and Levin, 1997). 
 
A key finding is drawn from this economics of science: individual factors, such as the 
researcher’s age (Diamond, 1986; Stephan and Levin, 1997; Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2003) or 
gender (Stephan, 1998), explain only a portion of observed differences in scientific 
production. Stephan (1996) recommends noting the collective nature of the research and 
the influences of scientific environment. Empirical evidence notes the influences of a 
laboratory’s or the department’s prestige on their researchers’ productivity (Cole and Cole, 
1973; Long and McGinnis, 1981). For Allison and Long (1990), two complementary 
mechanisms can explain this result. First, more prestigious departments attract more 
productive researchers. This selection effect then creates positive and cumulative 
advantages for the best researchers. This effect has been popularized by Merton (1968) as 
the Matthew effect. Second, in these departments, research conditions are more favorable, 
due to spillovers and access to more funding or better equipment. Mairesse and Turner 
(2002) also show that colleagues’ performance increases individual productivity. Using 
French data from the National Research Council (CNRS), they find that a 10 percent increase 
the laboratory production induces 0.6 more published papers per researcher (per year). 
With the same data, Adam and Griliches (1996) find poisitive scale returns, such that 
department size produces a significant but small effect on individual productivity. Finally, the 
composition of the department (Carayol and Matt, 2004, 2006), defined by the presence of 
post-doctoral fellows and the combination of full-time researchers and university professors, 
also may produce positive externalities. 
 
A large consensus seems thus to emerge to reflect the effects of scientific environment on 
individual scientific research. However, most of these studies focus on researchers in the 
United States. Yet other nations, such as France, feature university systems with institutional 
specificities (cf. U.S. universities) that affect their laboratories and scientific production. For 
example, academic research traditionally was financed by public funds, allocated mainly 
according to laboratory size rather than scientific production. Discussions of individual 
scientific production levels also have been limited mainly to topics related to careers and 
promotions. In contrast, recent reforms seek to improve universities’ autonomy (« LRU » 
law), create individual incentives for scientific production (research prizes, such as « Prime 
d’Excellence Scientifique »), and encourage universities to pursue fewer, more transversal 
projects to achieve agglomeration effects (« Idex » and « Labex » funding projects). These 
reforms thus create a need to evaluate individual scientific production and its determinants 
while also arousing concerns among French universities that face more research 
competition, even as they continue to work to pursue their educational missions. These 
reforms even could change how professors work—more precisely, how they split their time 
between research and teaching activities. For example, publication incentives may lead 
some professors to spend more time in research than in teaching activities. 
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But, the economics of science theory ignores this multidimensional nature of professors’ 
activities. Researchers working in a given research context are supposed to have a primary 
task: scientific production. Yet professors in French universities also must teach at least 192 
hours during every academic year. For Fox (1992), teaching and research activities conflict, 
such that time devoted to one activity decreases the time available for the other. The 
economics of science seems thus not to deal with the problem of multitasking. This is 
problematic as multitasking has strong impacts on organizations, jobs’ design and incentives. 
According to personnel economics (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991 ; Lazear, 1995), when 
agents face multiple duties (in a principal–agent framework), incentives can increase their 
effort and help them efficiently allocate their time among their job activities. But, personnel 
economics suppose that individual tasks do not depend on collective environment. 
 
Finally, the literature reveals a theoretical gap: the economics of science recommends to 
consider the influence of the scientific environment on individual research activities but 
denies multitasking while the personnel economics integrates multitasking but does not take 
into account collective externalities. 
To fullfill this gap, we therefore propose to study a multitasking setting to determine how 
professors allocate their time between research and teaching duties using a principal–agent 
model (Prasad, 2009), in which professors are heterogeneous in abilities to research and 
teach. With this model, we introduce the effect of the scientific context on the time devoted 
to each task. In turn, we predict that professors must be assigned tasks according to their 
relative abilities but also that a dynamic scientific context can improve their individual 
production, whatever their abilities. 
 
We use an original data set to test these predictions. With our novel database, we observe, 
for a sample of French economics professors, their scientific production and their time 
investments in pedagogical and administrative duties. We also collect indicators of the 
institutional context, related to both research and pedagogy. With these data, we estimate a 
publication score and teaching hours simultaneously, using a three-step least squares 
methodology. The results clearly confirm our theoretical predictions: Research and teaching 
tasks are conflicting demands for professors, but a more favorable scientific context can 
improve their scientific production, whatever the professors’ abilities.  
 
We structure the remainder of this article as follows: The next part presents the principal–
agent model with multitasking and externalities due to the scientific context. After we detail 
the data we used to test our theoretical predictions, we present the empirical strategy and 
then discuss our results. Finally, we conclude with some implications and limitations. 
 
 
2. Model 
A. General model 
We here address a principal–agent problem in which the risk-neutral principal, the 
university, assigns two tasks to the risk-averse agents, the professors: teaching or 
management (T) and research (R). As in MacDonald and Marx (2001), tasks are substitutable 
to agents but complementary to the principal. Each agent therefore splits available time 
(normalized to one unit) between the two tasks, such that when    defines the amount of 
time devoted to research activities,       refers to the time devoted to teaching and 
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managerial tasks. As Prasad (2009) and Thiele (2010) recognize, agents exhibit different skills 
with regard to conducting the two tasks. These task-specific abilities,   and  , influence the 
costs to agents to perform a task. Therefore, the cost function for a single agent   is given by: 
                  
 
We define three types of agents: a generalist and two specialists. A generalist faces the same 
costs to perform each task, so    . His or her costs function can be written as        . A 
teaching specialist instead faces a higher cost of performing research, so    . Finally, for a 
research specialist, we have     . 
 
In turn, for each task, the outcome is either a success (1) or a failure (0). The probability of 
success reflects the individual time spent on the activity. We here suppose that individual 
productions do not depend on environment. We relax this hypothesis in the next part. 
If both tasks fail, the principal obtains a minimal level of production  . If only one task 
succeeds, the principal obtains an output that depends on the time spent on this task. If the 
successful task involves research activities, the principal’s output is          . If 
instead teaching activities succeed, the output is              . In these latter 
cases,   and   are technological efficiency parameters that depend on the scientific, 
pedagogical, and administrative context. Finally, the principal obtains the maximal output 
when both tasks succeed, such that                    . Thus, if specialized 
agents succeed, the principal obtains a lower output than if both tasks were successfully 
completed by generalists. Tasks are complementary to the principal. 
 
The principal defines agents’ compensation by the vector                     
  , such that agents get paid   if the two activities fail,   +    if only teaching and 
managerial tasks succeeds,       if only research activities succeed, and        if 
both activities succeed. 
 
 Table 1 presents these outcomes, their associated probabilities, the principal’s outcomes 
(production), and the resulting contracts. 
 
Table 1: The principal–agent problem: a synthesis 
 
Outcomes (1,1) (1,0) (0,1) (0,0) 
Probabilities t(1-t) t2 (1-t)2 t(1-t) 
Production                             
Contracts                     
 
 
Furthermore, agents are risk averse and seek to maximize their expected utility. Let   be the 
agent’s utility function; it is strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable. For a 
given contract and time allocation, utility can be defined as:  
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The principal’s expected profit is: 
                            
 
 
with   is the expected cost associated with the contract and time allocation. 
 
 
When agents have no private information (about abilities or time allocation), the principal–
agent problem is: 
                   
  subject to an individual rationality constraint:  
                  
 
With Proposition 1 we examine how the time devoted to research depends on the relative 
abilities of agents; the proofs are in the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 1: In a full-information framework, it is optimal for an agent to allocate more 
time to his or her low-cost activity. 
 
The optimal time devoted to research thus given by : 
            
  
   
   
 
   
 
 
     
                          
with             and         (see the Appendix).  
 
Next, consider what happens for each type of agent. 
 
 
 
Let us discuss what happen for each type of agent. 
 
a) Generalist (   ) 
For a generalist, which is the condition we use as a benchmark in the rest of this article, the 
optimal time for research is:   
  
  
     
   
 
 
b) Specialist in research (   ) 
For a specialist in research tasks, the optimal time for research is:  
  
    
  
  
     
 
with an upward limit at one. 
 
c) Specialist in teaching (   ) 
For a specialist in teaching and managerial activities, the optimal time for research is:  
  
    
  
  
     
 
with a slowdown limit at zero. 
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With these equations, we can compare the optimal research times for the three profiles, 
which reveals   
    
    
 . A specialist devotes more time to the task that he is good for, 
compared to a generalist. A specialist devotes more time to the task that she or he is good 
at, compared with a generalist. This result is more intuitive if we assume   and   are equal 
to 1. In this case, as in Prasad (2009) and MacDonald and Marx (2001), a generalist splits her 
or his time equally across the two tasks, whereas a specialist rationally chooses to favor the 
less costly activity. Proposition 1 is in line with Fox’s (1992) findings, using data on U.S. 
researchers in four social sciences (economics, political science, psychology, and sociology), 
that more productive researchers spend less time teaching and more time in research 
activities.  
 
Finally, for the principal (university), it is optimal to assign professors to tasks according to 
their relative abilities: Those with better research skills should specialize in research, 
whereas those with poorer research abilities should combine research with managerial and 
teaching activities. This finding contradicts hierarchical theory (Sattinger, 1975; Rosen, 1982; 
Waldman, 1984) and proposes the most efficient workers should be assigned to managerial 
duties.  
 
These equilibrium properties derive from a general framework, in which the principal and 
agents have symmetric information. However, the principal might observe only the agents’ 
type, not their time allocations. In this asymmetric case, the principal must solve a moral 
hazard problem:  
                   
  subject to the individual rationality constraint:  
                  
as well as to the moral hazard constraint given by: 
                        
At the equilibrium, payments    are equal for all outcomes, so the individual rationality 
constraint depends on   only, through the cost function. We thus have:  
            
        
   
 
In the case of a generalist (   ), expected utility does not depend on  , so   
  
  
     
  . 
However, if agent   is a specialist, her or his expected utility is maximized when she or he 
devotes all her or his time to the personally less costly task. So if    , we obtain      
(research specialist) and if     , we have      (teaching and managerial activities 
specialist). These two solutions can be treated as the limiting cases for our general full 
information framework (Prasad, 2009).  
 
However, even in the asymmetric case, this general framework still assumes that agents’ 
production is perfectly independent of the scientific environment. This individual-level 
approach to predicting scientific production thus neglects the collective nature of research 
(Stephan, 1996). In the next section, we introduce the role of the scientific environment. 
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B. Multitasking and the scientific environment 
In a multitasking context, spillovers due to the scientific environment could influence how 
professors split their available time. Following Griliches (1979), we anticipate that scientific 
production results from access to knowledge stocks,  . Therefore, let            be 
individual research production. The stock of knowledge depends on the number of 
researchers in the department and the time they devote to research tasks, such that  
  . Now suppose that              . In that case, we can write:         
 
Furthermore, in a full information context, the principal–agent problem becomes: 
                                       
  subject to an individual rationality constraint:  
                  
 
With Proposition 2 we examine how the scientific environment affects the time devoted to 
research, with the proofs again provided in the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 2: In a full-information framework, it is optimal for an agent to allocate more 
time to research when scientific externalities arise, whatever his or her relative ability, but 
only if the stock of knowledge in the department is sufficient. 
 
Therefore, the optimal time devoted to research in this case is given by : 
             
  
   
        
 
     
                          
with             and         
 
 
Then, we can outline the outcomes for each type of agent. 
 
a) Generalist (   ) 
For a generalist, the optimal time for research is:  
  
     
  
    
   
If we compare this optimal time with and without externalities, we find that   
     
 . 
 
Furthermore, we note that   
     
  if  
     
   
   . When the number of researchers in 
the department is greater than  , a generalist can devote more time to research tasks if 
externalities are present (compared with a context without externalities). Finally,   
   has the 
following properties:         
     and     
  
  
   
  
     
Graphically, we thus have: 
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Graph 1: Stock of capital and time allocation of generalists 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Graph 1 shows, externalities do not always incite generalists to devote more time to 
research. It depends on the number of researchers in the department. If    , spillovers 
inside the department lead generalists to specialize more in research. But below   , 
generalists are not incited to spent more time on research compared with a context without 
externalities.  
 
b) Specialist in research (   ) 
For someone who specializes in research tasks, in the presence of scientific externalities, the 
optimal time for research is :   
     
     
  
    
 
 
 
c) Specialist in teaching (   ) 
For someone who specializes in teaching and managerial activities, the optimal time for 
research with externalities is :    
     
     
  
    
 
 
 
Finally, accounting for scientific externalities in a department does not affect the hierarchy 
of agents in terms of research time, because   
     
     
  . Externalities do not distort 
individual abilities to complete each task, but they do alter the time devoted to research for 
each type of agents, if the number of researchers in the laboratory exceeds a threshold  . 
The concentration of knowledge increases the time devoted to research activities, even if 
professors with greater teaching abilities spend less time on research than does a generalist 
or a research specialist, which suggests the existence of agglomeration effects for academics 
(Aghion, 2010). Our principal–agent model leads thus to two main conclusions: 
 • Tasks must be assigned according to relative individual abilities.  
 • The time devoted to research can be increased for all professors, whatever their 
abilities, when the laboratory size is sufficient, due to agglomeration externalities. 
 
 
 
 
N 
  
   
1 
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3. Data 
Following our theoretical framework, we next test how professors allocate their available 
time in a multitasking context and whether this allocation changes with the scientific 
context. This empirical analysis clearly departs from extant literature, in that we do not focus 
solely on scientific production but also are interested in the pedagogical dimension, which 
often remains unobserved. 
 
Therefore, we built an original data set using administrative data from the French Ministry of 
Education. With these data, we can observe 240 full professors in economics department, 
each of whom participated in the first three national competitions (2009–2011) for the 
“Prime d’Excellence Scientifique” (PES). Introduced in 2009, the PES competition involves a 
search for the most productive professors in each discipline in the four years prior to the 
competition. Similar to a tournament, candidates get ranked on the basis of four criteria: 
scientific production, quality of PhD supervising, scientific responsibilities, and scientific 
reputation at national and international levels. To enter this competition, applicants provide 
their scientific production, their number of teaching hours per year, and their administrative 
duties, together with a curriculum vita that indicates their individual characteristics, 
including age, experience, gender and their institutional affiliation.  
 
Before describing the tasks and individual attributes, we outline our sample. The 240 full 
professors in economics represent 44% of the total population, and their demographic 
characteristics are very similar to those of the overall population (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Sample and population of French economics professors  
 
 Population PES Sample 
Number 547 240 
% of male 
Age (in average) 
81,2% 
51,7 
77,9% 
49,2 
Source: Ministry of Education, 2011 
 
However, the scientific and pedagogical activities of the full population are unobservable, so 
we cannot determine if full professors in our sample are totally representative of all full 
professors in economics. We suspect that participation in the PES competition is not random 
but instead depends on observed and unobserved attributes. Unfortunately we cannot 
address this selection problem; to correct it, we could need instrumental variables that 
could explain just participation in the competition, not our two key variables. The 
administrative data we use, though extensive and unique, are not rich enough to reveal such 
variables. Thus, our results must be discussed with caution, due to the risk of selection bias. 
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Table 3: Variables and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ips Publication score  6.303 6.130 0 40.593 
hens Teaching hours + administrative duties 210.342 61.931 54 512 
male =1 if male 0.779   0 1 
exp Years of experience  18.292 9.198 2 40 
exp2 Square of experience 418.833 388.789 4 1600 
hi0506 h-index during the previous period 6.525 5.976 0 44 
lcitun 
Citation index of researchers of the same 
university (logs) 2.439 0.843 0 4.617 
lcitun2 lcitun squared 6.659 4.257 0 21.319 
scorup 
=1 if the citation score of the university is 
increasing 0.321   0 1 
ratio Number of students/Number of teachers 19.860 2.139 14.709 27.425 
Fields of research 
jelBN 
History of Economic Thought and Economic 
History 0.050   0 1 
jelC Mathematical and Quantitative Methods 0.088   0 1 
JelD Microeconomics 0.092   0 1 
jelE Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics 0.167   0 1 
jelF International Economics 0.050   0 1 
jelG Financial Economics 0.071   0 1 
jelHK Public Economics and Law and Economics 0.067   0 1 
jelIJ 
Health, Education, and Welfare and Labor 
economics 0.088   0 1 
jelL Industrial Organization 0.117   0 1 
JelM 
Business Administration and Business 
Economics; Marketing; Accounting 0.050   0 1 
jelO 
Economic Development, Technological Change, 
and Growth 0.050   0 1 
jelQ 
Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; 
Environmental and Ecological Economics 0.067   0 1 
jelR 
Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation 
Economics 0.046   0 1 
 
 
To measure individual scientific production, we used two indicators. A scientific production 
index, ips, is calculated as the number of articles published during the four years prior to the 
competition, weighted by the quality of the journal and number of co-authors. This indicator 
has been chosen as it is used as an indicator in promotion decisions in French universities 
(Levy-Garboua, 2008). We also used other indicators of scientific production, such as the h-
index restricted to four years before the competition. Our results are not sensitive to the 
choice of indicators. 
To calculate the ips score, we counted all articles published in journals included in the 
economics journal categorization of the French National Scientific Research Committee 
(CNRS). We use this ranking (which only pertains to France) to account for the quality of 
publications. We adopt a decreasing five-point score (5 = an article published in the most 
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prestigious journals, 1 = a publication in the less prestigious journals). For each publication, 
we also control for co-authorship, dividing each article’s score by the square root of the 
number of co-authors, to capture the individual PES applicant’s contribution to each co-
published article. Thus, an individual scientific production index is given by: 
         
     
        
 
  
  
  where    is the number of articles published by a given professor  ,        the score of a 
given journal,  , and         refers to the number of co-authors for each published paper  . 
 
  The descriptive statistics reveal the large dispersion of IPS scores, from 0 to 40.59 with a 
mean of 6.303. We also observe that the distribution of our scientific production index is 
asymmetric: A very high proportion of professors have low scores and few researchers have 
very high scores (see Graph 2), in accordance with Lotka (1926)’s law. 
 
Graph 2: Distribution of the scientific production index 
 
 
Prior literature also has noted a Matthew’s effect (Merton, 1968), which refers to path 
dependency in scientific production scores. Therefore, we construct another scientific 
production index to take past production into account, using a lagged h index (Hirsch, 2005) 
to measure scientific output, weighted by the number of citations per publication between 
1985 and the year preceding the competition. We again find a strong asymmetric 
distribution of researchers’ past h indexes, with a mean value of 6.52 and a large dispersion 
between 0 and 44. Finally, past scientific production could reflect unobservable research 
abilities, which is a key parameter of our principal–agent model.   
 
 
  The main originality of our dataset is to also identify pedagogical and administrative 
activities. For each professor, we measure the mean of annual teaching hours at the under-
graduated or graduated level (bachelor degree, master degree and PhD degree) in the last 
two academic years before the PES competition. Note that, in the French academic system, 
professors are civil servant and must teach at least 192 hours per academic year. Of course, 
they can choose to teach more. They then receive an additional salary, commensurate with 
the number of overtime hours performed. 
In addition to teaching duties, professors can be involved in administrative tasks. These 
administrative activities can be done at the department level (as dean of the department or 
of the scientific laboratory), at the university level (as being member of the University 
council, such as President of the University) or at a national level (as being member of 
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French National Council of Universities or of the National Scientific Research Committee, 
etc.). For all these duties, professors receive a premium, calculated as a given number of 
equivalent teaching hours (according to a national referential)i. To take into account the 
wide diversity in the educational and administrative investment, we decided to aggregate 
teaching hours and hours in administrative duties. The obtained index, denoted hens, varies 
between 54 and 512 hours per year with a mean value at 210 (see graph 3), a level very 
closed to the teaching statutory service. Note that, in our sample, 37% of the professors 
teach less than the conventional service (less than 192 hours). This could be explained by 
sabbatical vacancies, allowing professors to concentrate on their research project and to be 
exempted of any teaching duties for one semester or a complete year. 
 
Graph 3: Distribution of the teaching and administrative hours 
 
 
The descriptive statistics thus show great heterogeneity in professors’ investments in 
research and teaching. Some professors specialize in teaching or research; others are 
generalists. These types may reflect their individual abilities, which we denoted    and   in 
our theoretical framework. However, their abilities are often unobservable. Therefore, we 
propose to identify each professor’s type, according to his or her level of investment in each 
task, compared against the median investment observed in the sample. Thus, 
 • Generalists are those professors who achieve higher publication and teaching scores 
than the median. 
 • Research specialists are professors who score higher only on the publication side. 
 • Teaching specialists are those who score higher only on the teaching side, 
 • Professors who score lower than the median on both tasks are free riders. 
 
In addition to their scientific production and investment in teaching and administrative 
duties, our data reveal some individual attributes about the professors, as well as their fields 
of research, according to a set of dummies reflecting the JEL classifications of their 
publications. Following Rauber and Ursprung (2008), we anticipate that research fields might 
have two effects on scientific production. First, some fields could be more prolific because of 
their high concentration of scientists, large international networks, or complementarities 
with other fields (e.g., econometrics, game theory). Second, some research fields might have 
been enhanced by consulting activities in the private sector. Professors rationally might 
choose to devote more time to these lucrative activities than to academic publications. We 
also consider research fields as determinants of teaching hours. Interactions between 
research and teaching activities might induce some scope economies or, conversely, reduce 
teaching competencies. We thus wonder if it might be difficult to assign enough courses to 
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ultra-specialist teachers in their fields of expertise. In contrast, professors with a broad 
research field (e.g., macroeconomics, microeconomics, public economics, quantitative 
techniques) could be asked more readily to teach the wide range of courses needed. 
 
Finally, we seek to identify whether the scientific environment influences the time devoted 
to research and teaching tasks. The PES data set does not directly reveal this information but 
instead indicates the institutional affiliation of each professor. With this information, we can 
collect additional data to identify the professors’ work environment. First, to identify the 
scientific context, we use impact factors for French economic departments, as provided by 
Bosquet and Combes (2011). Departmental impact factors, denoted citun, refer to the sum 
of individual impact factors (production weighted by citations, based on Google Scholar) of 
all members during 2004–2008, or immediately before the PES competition. In addition to 
this static indicator, we use a dynamic measure of the departments in which the impact 
factor has increased most strongly (scoreup). Such a favorable evolution in the scientific 
context occurs among 35.5% of the departments observed in our sample.  
 
In this empirical work, we can also identify some characteristics of the teaching and 
administrative context which can influence the individual investment in teaching activites. 
We mobilized data from the French Ministry of Education about the number of students and 
number of professors per university (in 2010). We constructed a ratio of these two variables 
(variable “ratio” in Table 3) that gives the number of students per professor.  
 
Graph 4 presents the distribution of individual scientific production scores and pedagogical 
duties according to the collective environment. For the scientific context, we define two 
departmental categories: high impact factors (25% highest scores) and low impact factors 
(25% lowest scores). For pedagogical context, we adopt the same method, according to the 
value of the ratio of students to professor.  
 
Graph 4: Distribution of tasks scores according to scientific and pedagogical contexts 
 
 
As Graph 4 clearly shows, the institutional context affects both individual scientific production 
and pedagogical investment. The median scientific score is about 8.22 when professors belong 
to the most productive departments, whereas it is only 5.05 for the least productive ones. 
Moreover, the average number of hours performed per year greater than 21 hours in 
understaffed teaching universities. These statistics argue for a more detailed study of the effect 
of context on multitasking. 
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4. Estimations and discussion 
To identify the effect of the scientific environment on professors’ scientific production, we 
consider two substitutive tasks that face professors, such that investing in one tasks determines 
the time available to devote to the other task. In turn, we estimate the following the system of 
equations:  
 
                               
                               
  
where lips is the logarithm of scientific production index (ips), lhens is the logarithm of teaching 
hours (hens),     is a vector of individual attributes and   describes collective context in 
research and pedagogy. 
 
To estimate this two-equation system, we solve a simultaneity problem that may cause a 
correlation in the error terms among the equations. We use a three-least squares estimation 
(Zellner and Theil, 1962), which adopts an instrumental variable approach to produce consistent 
estimates and generalized least squares (GLS) to account for the correlation structure in the 
disturbances across the two equations. We also control for heteroscedasticity with Greene’s 
(2007) method. Moreover, we performed a Hansen-Sargan overidentification test (Davidson 
and MacKinnon, 2004; Baum et al., 2003), and we computed overall system R-square values 
(Greene, 2007). We estimate the two-equation system for the whole sample, and then 
separately for each type of professor (free-riders, research specialists, teaching specialists, 
generalists). Table 4 contains all the results.  
 
Regarding the estimates’ quality, the Hansen and Sargan overidentification test indicates that 
the models are well identified. The goodness of fit of our estimates is high (close to 80%), 
though somewhat lower for the free-riders segment (R2 = 0.52). Explaining the behavior of these 
professors appears relatively difficult, probably due to the strong influence of unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
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Table 4: Effects of the institutional context on professors’ tasksii 
 
Full sample Free-rider Specialist in research Specialist in teaching Generalist 
lips lhens lips lhens lips lhens  lips lhens  lips lhens 
lhens 
-2.295 
(0.579***)  
-14.103 
(30.921
ns
)  
-1.988 
(0.278***)  
-5.090 
(0.599***)   
-1.003  
(0.570*)   
lips  
-0.245 
(0.015***)  
-0.280 
(0.044***)  
-0.416 
(0.045***)   
-0.012 
(0.019
ns
)   
0.141  
(0.019***) 
male 
0.357 
(0.108***) 
0.154 
(0.014***) 
1.957  
(4.389
ns
) 
0.112 
(0.026***) 
0.316 
(0.057***) 
0.146 
(0.022***) 
0.958 
(0.129***) 
0.151 
(0.016***) 
-.021  
(0.062***) 
0.020  
(0.013
ns
) 
exp: experience 
-0.039 
(0.011***) 
-0.011 
(0.003***) 
-0.254  
(0.212
ns
) 
-0.025 
(0.007***) 
-0.027 
(0.010***) 
-0.012 
(0.005**) 
0.056 
(0.014***) 
0.010  
(0.003***) 
0.041 
(0.011***) 
-0.014  
(0.003***) 
exp2: exp
2
 
0.0003 
(0.0002
ns
) 
0.0001 
(0.00006**) 
0.004  
(0.002*) 
0.0004 
(0.0001***) 
0.0004 
(0.0002**) 
0.0002 
(0.0001**) 
-0.002 
(0.0003***) 
-0.0003 
(0.00006***) 
-0.001 
(0.0003***) 
0.0005 
(0.00006***) 
jelC: mathematics 
-0.073 
(0.082
ns
) 
-0.037  
(0.020*) 
7.641 
(14.529
ns
) 
-0.026  
(0.093
ns
) 
-0.488 
(0.109***) 
-0.229 
(0.034***) 
-1.335 
(0.109***) 
-0.099 
 (0.021***) 
-0.244 
(0.084***) 
0.088  
(0.015***) 
jelD: microeconomics 
0.678 
(0.069***) 
0.178 
(0.021***) 
9.334 
(14.878
ns
) 
0.402 
(0.064***) 
-0.306 
(0.093***) 
-0.152 
(0.029***) 
-0.007  
(0.087
ns
) 
-0.025  
(0.020
ns
) 
0.220 
(0.063***) 
0.042  
(0.015***) 
jelE: macroeconomics 
-0.043 
(0.080
ns
) 
-0.052 
(0.015***) 
0.820  
(1.118
ns
) 
0.024 
(0.029
ns
) 
-0.360 
(0.075***) 
-0.174 
(0.028***) 
-0.327 
(0.055***) 
-0.024  
(0.015
ns
) 
0.052  
(0.051
ns
) 
-0.062  
(0.012***) 
jelHK: public economics 
0.524 
(0.070***) 
0.141 
(0.020**) 
3.661  
(5.522
ns
) 
0.213  
(0.037
ns
) 
0.769 
(0.076***) 
0.344 
(0.053***) 
0.043 
 (0.074
ns
) 
-0.025  
(0.017
ns
) 
0.346 
(0.075***) 
-0.175  
(0.018***) 
hi0506: Lagged h-index 
0.021 
(0.007***)  
0.073  
(0.086
ns
)  
0.002 
(0.005
ns
)  
0.037 
(0.003***)   
0.063 
(0.006***)   
citun: Department’s 
citation score 
0.297 
(0.095***)  
0.313  
(2.103
ns
)  
0.442 
(0.138***)  
1.003 
(0.103***)   
0.541 
(0.174***)   
citun2: (citun)
2
 
-0.045 
(0.014***)  
-0.695  
(1.286
ns
)  
-0.073 
(0.023***)  
-0.258 
(0.023***)   
-0.119 
(0.037***)   
scorup: great increase in 
collective impact factor 
-0.071 
(0.026***)  
1.168  
(2.654
ns
)  
-0.070 
(0.037***)  
-0.347 
(0.091***)   
-0.226 
(0.055***)   
ratio: Student per 
professor  
0.048 
(0.018***)  
-0.028  
(0.037
ns
)  
0.024 
(0.053
ns
)   
0.143  
(0.074*) 
6.683  
(3.262**) 
0.091  
(0.018***) 
ratio2: ratio
2
  
-0.001 
(0.0004**)  
0.001  
(0.001
ns
)  
-0.0005 
(0.001
ns
)   
-0.003  
(0.002*)   
-0.002 
(0.0004***) 
constant 
13.330 
(3.154***) 
5.127 
(0.219***) 
76.974 
(160.532
ns
) 
5.589 
(0.389***) 
11.944 
(1.397***) 
5.811 
(0.632***) 
27.143 
(3.144***) 
3.906  
(0.730***) 
6.683  
(3.262**) 
4.426  
(0.183***) 
Observations 
R
2
 
Hansen-Sargan test value 
240 
0.891 
19.201*** 
57 
0.524 
16.994** 
63 
0.792 
15.915** 
61 
0.798 
16.003** 
59 
0.846 
19.289*** 
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According to results in table 4, the tasks are conflicting, as predicted in our model. When we 
consider the tasks simultaneously, we find that investing heavily in one activity limits the 
time available for other, except for among free riders. Moreover, we observe that for both 
generalists and specialists, the between-task elasticities are asymmetric: The negative 
influence of teaching activities on scientific production is always stronger than the negative 
effect of publishing on pedagogical duties. This result likely is a direct consequence of the 
statutory teaching hours (192 hours) and the asymmetric flexibility around this threshold 
value. Increasing teaching hours above this level is easy for each professor in the French 
academia, but it is less easy to perform less. Only professors who invest in administrative 
activities or defend a sabbatical can negotiate a reduction in their teaching duties. 
Moreover, when a professor receives an agreement to teach less during a given next 
academic year, his or her courses get affected to other professors, and there is no guarantee 
for the incumbent to recover these courses in the future. Not surprisingly, it is thus easier to 
adjust research activities when teaching tasks increase. Conversely, it seems to be harder to 
reduce teaching duties when a professor wants to invest more in research activities, 
demonstrating the existence of a ratcheting effect. 
  
Although research and pedagogical activities are substitutable for professors, they are 
complementary for universities (principals), which have an interest in seeing teachers do 
both tasks simultaneously. This divergence of interests between the principal and agents 
requires a better understanding of the determinants of investments in both tasks to design 
relevant incentive schemes. Our estimates identify precisely which variables explain such 
investments.  
 They depend primarily on individual characteristics. Men invest more time, on 
average, in both tasks than women. Following Becker (1957), female professors could face 
more challenges in combining their professional activity with family responsibilities. 
However, the gender effect also differs according to professors’ types. For generalists for 
example, men show presents lower scientific production scores and equivalent teaching and 
administrative duties, perhaps as a result of gender differences in multitasking abilities 
(Criss, 2006). In this case, women might be more productive than men in multitasking 
activities, whereas men are globally more efficient because they specialize. 
 Our results also confirm a negative impact of experience on both publication scores 
and pedagogical duties. A life cycle thus seems likely, in that experience consistently 
produces a negative effect that worsens over time in our data. This finding may appear 
surprising, but we note that our sample consists of only full professors, who all have 
substantial experience. We probably even miss the period of massive investment in scientific 
production that professors undergo to maximize their chances of promotion and tenure or 
for greater remuneration in the early stages of their careers. 
 We also find a path dependency effect among the publication scores: Professors with 
high past h indexes are more productive, in accordance with a Matthew effect for French 
economics professors. This effect could indicate that the most productive professors have 
easier access to funds, attract the best coauthors, and are recruited by the best laboratories. 
Because of their better research environments, they enjoy an advantage in scientific 
production. The Matthew effect also could mean that the most productive professors have 
specific research skills, which arise throughout their careers.  
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Our results also extend findings by Rauber and Ursprung (2008), who concluded that 
research fields significantly affect scientific output. These fields also have an impact on the 
number of teaching hours, according to our findings. For example, specialists in public 
economics have a comparative advantage in the production of science and are frequently 
solicited to teach. This advantage could be attributed to the central role of this field in 
current economics research, as well as in economic policy (e.g., pollution issues, imperfect 
competition, social equity). 
 
Our results confirm the key prediction of our model: A dynamic scientific context (citun) 
favors individual scientific production by all professors, except for free riders. This finding 
also is consistent with the conclusions of economics of science theory; not only do we 
include the collective dimension of research, but we also account for multitasking. The 
positive effects of a dynamic research environment are stronger for teaching specialists and 
for generalists. The creation of agglomeration effects, as recommended by Aghion (2010), 
therefore can increase the scientific output of all professors, including those who initially do 
not have the strongest research abilities. Moreover, our results allow us to make two points 
about the impact of agglomeration effects. First, the positive effects of a dynamic research 
environment seem to diminish gradually as the universities’ impact factors rise (citun2), as 
we expected. Agglomeration effects thus are characterized by diminishing returns. Second, a 
gradual implementation of these agglomeration effects appears preferable; belonging to a 
university that experiences a sharp increase (relative to the median) of its impact factor 
(scorup) actually is unfavorable for individual scientific output. This result may emerge 
because the sudden improvement of an impact factor generally follows sweeping university 
governance reforms, such as mergers of research teams. These changes can create tensions 
and, at least in the short term, adversely affect scientific output. 
 
Moreover, teaching activities depend also on the context. Working in an understaffed 
university (higher ratio of students per professor) significantly increases the number of 
teaching hours undertaken by a professor. This pedagogical context affects both generalists 
and teaching specialists; it does not change behaviors of research specialists or free riders. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have analyzed the determinants of scientific production, including collective 
determinants related to the research environment, in the context of multitasking teachers. 
In this sense, we combine the key features of the economics of science with the personnel 
economics.  
 
We propose a principal–agent model to understand how university professors divide their 
time between two substitutable tasks: publishing and teaching. Our theoretical framework 
predicts that professors devote more time to the task for which they have a marginal 
advantage. According to their abilities, they can be either generalists or specialists. However, 
the scientific context, and especially collective scientific production, strongly influences 
these optimal behaviors too. Thus, a dynamic context characterized by a high stock of 
knowledge in the research lab or university improves individual publication scores by 
creating positive knowledge externalities. 
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To test these predictions, we used French data from administrative sources. This original 
data set enables us to observe both scientific production and pedagogical duties. Our results 
also confirm that these tasks are conflicting and that the institutional context affects the 
activity choices that professors make.  
 
Finally, we conclude that universities, or the principals in our principal–agent framework, 
can influence the activities of their agents (professors) by implementing appropriate 
incentive schemes, such as assigning professors to the tasks for which they are inherently 
more talented. They also can play on collective research aspects by favoring dynamic 
scientific contexts (including agglomeration effects) that increase scientific output in total. 
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Appendix  
Suppose that   defines the wage that an agent receives. Payments are equal for all outcomes, so the individual 
rationality constraint becomes                     . 
This constraint must be binding, so     
                   
If we define      , the principal must solve the following problem: 
   
 
                                   
The first order condition of this problem is: 
 
   
 
 
     
                            
 
The resolution is equivalent when we introduce scientific externalities. In this case, the principal’s problem is 
given by:  
   
 
                                   
and the first-order condition becomes:  
     
 
     
                          
 
 
 
                                                        
i For example, a President of an University receives a premium equivalent to 192 teaching hours. 
ii Standard deviations are given in brackets.  
NB:***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; significant at 10%; ns: non significant 
 
